Comparative Legal Analysis of Corporate Activism in the Anglo-Saxon and Continental Models. Prospects for the Development of the Institute in Russia
https://doi.org/10.21686/2411-118X-2022-1-82-91
Abstract
The rapid development of corporate law in the modern world makes corporate governance the most important
aspect of the success of current companies. Corporate activism or shareholder activism is meant as part of the
corporate governance system. Changes in the company that have occurred as a result of successful actions of
activist shareholders increase the value of shares, and therefore, the overall goal is achieved - the welfare of the company. However, changes often concern precisely inefficient management, which, as a result of changes in the corporation, shifts. Nevertheless, corporate activism can be considered a mechanism that is designed, if not to reduce, then certainly to balance shareholders and the board. At the same time, the subject of this work is a comparative legal study of corporate activism in the USA, Great Britain, Germany and the Russian Federation.
The author considers the elements of corporate activism, its goals, and draws a parallel between the theoretical aspects and the practical application of the rules on shareholder activism in the world. The article examines the viability of this institution in the countries of the continental legal model, in particular in Germany and the Russian Federation. Special attention is paid to the prospects for the development of corporate activism in the Russian Federation. Conclusions are formulated about the role of corporate activism on the activities of corporations in these jurisdictions. In conclusion, the author concludes about the effectiveness of corporate activism in the countries of the Anglo-Saxon legal model and the lack of elaboration of norms and its weak influence on corporate governance in Germany and the Russian Federation.
Keywords
About the Author
V. T. EminovRussian Federation
Student of the Faculty of Law of Lomonosov Moscow State University
1-13, Leninskiye Gory, Moscow, 111992
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Review
For citations:
Eminov V.T. Comparative Legal Analysis of Corporate Activism in the Anglo-Saxon and Continental Models. Prospects for the Development of the Institute in Russia. ECONOMICS. LAW. SOCIETY. 2022;7(1):82-91. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.21686/2411-118X-2022-1-82-91