Overcoming Information Asymmetries in Corporate Governance. Legal Methods for Solving Economic Problems

The article is devoted to the problem of information asymmetry in the field of corporate governance, as a manifestation of economic opportunism in the appointment and implementation of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of corporate organizations. The paper provides an overview and analysis of the existing legal mechanisms and complex legal institutions aimed at ensuring the interests of shareholders when causing losses through the fault of the executive bodies of the corporation. There are suggestions of other methods of securing liabilities due to unfair or unqualified management behavior that are known and used in related legal sub-branches of business law, as well as fundamentally new mechanisms. To the first one can be attributed, first of all, the mortgage of the personal property of the director, as well as the pledge of securities belonging to him or participation in other commercial organizations; the peculiarities of legal support of such transactions in relation to the legal relations between shareholders and hired management are considered. The second can be attributed to various types of recommendations, both secured by property guarantees of the recommending as recommended, and expressing only personal professional or authoritative, for other reasons, judgment of the person giving the characteristic; introduced the concept of "responsible recommendation". It also examined the possibilities of using legal institutions for insuring the professional liability of a director, creating special compensation funds of hired directors, using escrow accounts and nominal accounts to ensure the interests of participants of business societies, analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of individual methods, and features of use in the described area. The results obtained can be used both in the practice of state or municipal management of public property, and by holdings based on private capital.

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