The article examines the correlation between the categories of the method and the way of legal regulation in the measurement of civil law. Based on an analysis of the provisions of legislation and legal doctrine, the author concludes that the idea of a unified method of legal regulation that does not take into account the specifics of specific branches of law and its identification with the category of the way of legal regulation are counterproductive. The priority value belongs not to the way, but to the method of legal regulation, which is a sign of the delimitation of entire branches of law, reflects their essence and determines the vector of development. It is substantiated that, due to the permissible nature of civil law, the system-forming role of the authorizing norms in its structure and content, the civil legal method should be understood differentially as a set of legal regulation way (authorization, prohibition and obligation), a different combination of which (but with the primacy of permission) reflects the specifics of the functioning of the coordination method aimed at establishing and guaranteeing the legal equality of participants in civil relations and ensuring independent value of their will. It is argued that overcoming a number of particular problems requires further study of authorization as a key civilistic way of legal regulation, followed by its normative consolidation as a starting point of civil law.