eclasocЭКОНОМИКА. ПРАВО. ОБЩЕСТВОECONOMICS. LAW. SOCIETY2411-118XФГБОУ ВО «РЭУ им. Г.В. Плеханова»eclasoc-172Research ArticleМЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ И ПРАВОINTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND LAWГлобальная сеть финансовой безопасности: фрагментация международного валютного права или регионализация?Global Financial Safety Net: Fragmenting International Monetary Law vs. Regionalisation?МехтиевМ. Г.MekhtiyevM. G.

аспирант, научный сотрудник отдела научного обеспечения деятельности секретариата делегации Российской Федерации в Европейской комиссии за демократию через право (Венецианской комиссии)

107078, Москва, Большой Харитоньевский переулок, д. 22/24

Postgraduate Student, Researcher of the Department of Scientific Support for the Secretariat of the Russian Delegation to the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)

22/24 Bolshoy Kharitonyevskiy Lane, Moscow, 107078

mekhtiev.mg@gmail.comИнститут законодательства и сравнительного правоведения при Правительстве Российской ФедерацииРоссияInstitute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Government of the Russian FederationRussian Federation201921052020033343Copyright © Мехтиев М.Г., 20202020Мехтиев М.Г.Mekhtiyev M.G.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://epo.rea.ru/jour/article/view/172

Статья изучает тенденции формирования глобальной сети финансовой безопасности. Автор анализирует различные подходы стран Запада и некоторых государств «Группы двадцати» и государств – членов БРИКС к регулированию деятельности международных финансовых механизмов, составляющих Сеть. Так, первые считают, что международные финансовые механизмы предоставления иностранной ликвидности должны регулироваться на основе единых правил в рамках МВФ, в то время как вторая группа выступает за децентрализованную, горизонтально ориентированную сеть механизмов. Исследование в рамках данной статьи основано на дедуктивном методе с применением преимущественно синтеза, так как текущее положение глобальной сети финансовой безопасности требует разработки концепции института международных финансовых механизмов предоставления иностранной ликвидности в международном валютном праве (что является обоснованием выбора дедуктивного метода), с одной стороны, и изучения причин и тенденций фрагментации международного валютного права (посредством синтеза) с другой. Автор приходит к выводу, что регионализация мировой денежно-кредитной системы, вызванная интеграционными процессами на региональном уровне, является причиной появления международных финансовых механизмов в тех государствах, чьи интересы из-за доминирования стран Запада в МВФ не учитываются должным образом. Так, для решения проблем, связанных с функционированием глобальной сети финансовой безопасности, необходимо определить статус центрального банка в международных валютных отношениях для упорядочения сети своп-соглашений между центральными банками – главного инструмента предоставления иностранной ликвидности, который стал надежным инструментом преодоления дефицита платежного баланса во всем мире.

The article studies a trend that forms a Global Financial Safety Net. The author analyses difference in approaches of Western countries and some G20 states and BRICS Member States to regulate international financial mechanisms’ activities, which form the Net. Thus, the former believe that international financial mechanisms for providing foreign liquidity should be regulated based on uniform rules within the IMF, while the latter advocates a decentralized, horizontally oriented net of mechanisms. The research is based on the deductive method using mainly synthesis. This is due to the Global Financial Safety Net’s current state, that requires to develop in international currency law the concept of international financial mechanism institutions that provide foreign liquidity (which is the reason why deductive method is chosen). Also studying causes and trends of fragmentation in international monetary law requires synthesis as an approach to achieve the aim in this article. The author concludes that a regionalization in a global monetary system, driven by regional international processes, is the reason why international financial mechanisms emerged. The latter reflects interests of those countries, whose interests are not properly taken into account in the IMF, as it is dominated by Western countries. So, to solve the problems associated with the functioning of the Global Financial Safety Net, it is necessary to determine the status of central banks in international monetary relations in order to streamline the network of swap agreements between central banks – the main tool for providing foreign liquidity, which has become a reliable tool to overcome the balance of payments deficit worldwide.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.