eclasocЭКОНОМИКА. ПРАВО. ОБЩЕСТВОECONOMICS. LAW. SOCIETY2411-118XФГБОУ ВО «РЭУ им. Г.В. Плеханова»eclasoc-126Research ArticleПРАВО И ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТЬLAW AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITYМеждународная денежно-кредитная система, основанная на правилах разумной политикиInternational Monetary System Based on the Rules of Reasonable PolicyМехтиевМ. Г.MekhtiyevM. G.

аспирант, научный сотрудник отдела научного обеспечения деятельности секретариата делегации Российской Федерации в Европейской комиссии за демократию через право (Венецианской комиссии)

107078, Москва, Большой Харитоньевский переулок, д. 22/24

Postgraduate Student, Researcher of the Department of Scientific Support for the Secretariat of the Russian Delegation to the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)

22/24 Bolshoy Kharitonyevskiy Lane, Moscow, 107078

mekhtiev.mg@gmail.comИнститут законодательства и сравнительного правоведения при Правительстве Российской ФедерацииРоссияInstitute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Government of the Russian FederationRussian Federation201920052020018894Copyright © Мехтиев М.Г., 20202020Мехтиев М.Г.Mekhtiyev M.G.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://epo.rea.ru/jour/article/view/126

Данная статья посвящена анализу взаимозависимости деятельности центральных банков (ЦБ). Эта взаимозависимость обусловлена не только влиянием состояния международной финансовой системы на деятельность центральных банков, но также и влиянием действий ЦБ одних стран на ведение денежно-кредитной политики других стран. Соответственно, есть необходимость исследовать новое направление в международном валютном праве – ведение международной денежно-кредитной политики. Данное направление требует также принятия практических мер международным сообществом, а точнее – создания как общих правил ведения денежно-кредитной политики ЦБ государств, так и правил их взаимодействия на межправительственном уровне. Ввиду этого в статье используется дедуктивный метод исследования. Существование международной денежно-кредитной политики и отсутствие ее осмысления, а также формирования правовой базы требует разработки концепции регулирования указанной сферы. Автор статьи приходит к заключению, что правила осуществления международной денежно-кредитной политики способны найти баланс между независимостью ЦБ в ведении монетарной политики, с одной стороны, и созданием условий для предотвращения дестабилизации мировой финансовой системы, с другой, через гармонизацию правовых и валютных режимов в рамках национальной юрисдикции.

This article is devoted to the analysis of central bank (CB) activities’ interdependence. This interdependence is caused not only by the influence of the international financial system’s conditions on CB activities, but also by some CBs actions’ influence on the monetary policy conduct in other countries. Accordingly, there is a need to explore a new legal field in international monetary law – international monetary policy conducts. This field also requires the adoption of practical measures by the international community, or rather, the creation of both general rules for the conduct of monetary policy by central banks and rules of their interaction at the intergovernmental level. In view of this, the article uses the deductive method for the research. The existence of an international monetary policy and the absence of its comprehension, as well as the formation of a legal framework, requires the development of a concept for regulating this sphere. The author concludes that the rules for the implementation of international monetary policy can find a balance between the independence of the CB in the conduct of monetary policy on the one hand, and creating conditions for preventing destabilization of the global financial system on the other, through the harmonization of legal and monetary regimes within national jurisdiction.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.